I
am grateful to Anastasia Scrutton for opening up a very important area for thought, reflection, and practice. Her paper presents a fascinating argument for an understanding of depression that is framed as a potentially spiritually transformative experience with positive therapeutic implications. In doing so, she offers a way for theologians, philosophers, and practitioners to effectively perceive, understand, and engage with the spiritual dimensions of the experience of depression. As such, she has made an important contribution to the ongoing and often fraught conversations around the role of spirituality in understanding mental health issues. The models she outlines neatly encapsulates a broad range of experience and her development of and preference toward the potentially transformative (PT) model of spiritual experience is compassionate and helpful. Although I do not necessarily agree with everything that she has said, I do respect, value, and appreciate her work on this vital area for theory and practice. There are, however, some significant issues that require clarification, critique, and further conversation.
The Problem of the "Natural": In What Sense Does Depression Actually "Exist"?
One of the basic presumptions that underpins the study and its conclusions is that depression is a natural entity which can clearly be identified and responded to. Throughout there is a general assumption that depression is a definable entity or 'thing' that we can look at and examine with regard to its implications for our understanding of spirituality, spiritual experience, and therapeutic intervention. Throughout, it is named as a pathological entity that requires professional identification, authentication, and intervention. Such reification of depression as a pathological entity is problematic. As Dan G. Blazer notes in his reflections on the nature of major depression, when a diagnosis is reified:
[t]he assumption seems to be that there is a "real disease" called major depression and, by attaching the label, the psychiatrist pronounces that the patient has this disease. (This process of making an idea real has been labelled "reification.") Reification numbs us to the possibility that depression can be more a signal of the emotionally toxic society in which we live than a thing in and of itself. And if the effects of this toxicity are initially expressed through depression, then depression should signal a need to better understand and improve society. (Blazer 2005, 6) Pilgrim and Bentall cast further doubt on whether there is a single, easily identifiable entity called 'depression' that can be recognized cross-culturally or even intraculturally: there appears to be no consistent transcultural, transhistorical agreement about minimal necessary and sufficient pathognomic criteria for the phenomenon of interest. For this reason, depression, like other functional psychiatric diagnoses such as schizophrenia ... is a disjunctive concept, potentially applicable to two or more patients with no symptoms in common. (Pilgrim and Bentall 1999, 263) If Blazer and Pilgrim and Bentall are correct, then we have a problem. In what sense can depression be described as 'natural' or even inevitably 'pathological' if it is a disputed and disjunctive concept?
Pilgrim and Bentall also point out that the description of depression and the symptomatic definitional criteria offered by people experiencing deep sadness often differs significantly from that offered by professionals and mental health 'experts.' So the question then is: Whose reality counts? To make claims about the naturalness of depression and to declare knowledge of depression using the language of pathology (which is clearly a medical/professional discourse), one needs to take sides. The language of depression as pathology is fundamental to Scrutton's argument. Yet the validity of such a claim is deeply controversial.
This point becomes important, for example, when she criticizes Dein and Durà-Vilà's idea of there being two forms of depression. She pushes back on their position by suggesting that "distinguishing between two forms of depression risks limiting the potential of depression diagnosed as 'pathological' to become transformative and therefore 'salutary'" (Scrutton 2015, 284) . It is interesting that Blazer talks about the numbing effect of reification. He notes the way in which it distracts our gaze away from society and onto the individual's perceived pathology, even though the cause of the sadness may well lie elsewhere. I wonder if by simply accepting depression as a pathological given, Scrutton risks becoming reliant on a model that may not in fact capture the full breadth and depth of the experience of deep sadness? Has her reification of depression numbed us to the fact that arguing against positions such as Dein and Durà-Vilà's, which suggest that there may be more than one type/form of depression, and that some depression may be legitimately perceived as spiritually oriented causally and experientially, overly locates depression within the boundaries of individual bodies? Likewise, has the atheological approach of the PT model that Scrutton seems to prefer numbed us to the fact that God's direct involvement in the spiritual illness (SI) and the spiritual health (SH) models may not be epiphenomenal or quite so easily disposed of?
Materialism, Reductionism, and Therapeutic Deism
It is interesting to note the way in which within Scrutton's approach to the spiritual interpretation of depression seems to have to prove itself in materialistic terms, by being 'therapeutic.' The pathological definition of depression is natural and given, but spiritual dimensions need to be proven or at least validated in accordance with the criteria of therapy and therapeutic outcomes. Scrutton dismisses the SI model primarily on the grounds that it can hurt people and that an emphasis on depression as an SI is a negative interpretation that serves to further stigmatize people experiencing depression. Although I have much sympathy with this viewpoint, it reflects a theological and often a homiletical problem, (the latter of which Scrutton acknowledges in relation to the PT model), rather than simply a therapeutic one. The SI and indeed the SH models can, of course, be highly problematic. However, they retain a critical theological dimension that is missing from the PT model. The PT model may well be preferential in terms of its therapeutic power. However, its theological rooting and drive is much weaker than the other two models.
Positively, the PT model opens up the possibility of looking at depression differently and looking for different things within those experiences of sadness that we have given the name of depression. According to this approach, depression is a natural experience that can be interpreted differently and within which a person can grow and be transformed spiritually. However, stripped of its transcendent dimensions this model begins to look suspiciously like a form of spiritually oriented self-actualization wherein a person can overcome the pathological dimensions of depression and come to a place where they see and interpret it as a transformative experience. But, in what sense can this be claimed as a distinctively spiritual experience, unless we define spirituality in generic, non-religious terms, which is clearly not what the SI and the SH models claim to do. If the SI and the SH models are self-consciously God oriented and God centered, and the PT model is considerably less so (and indeed not necessarily so at all), are we actually comparing like with like within the three models? It seems that within the PT model we encounter a significant change of emphasis from a God-oriented perspective on depression to one that is materialistic and individualistic, basing its premises on psychiatry and human effort. Bearing in mind that the paper begins with a strong statement that it is located within theology and philosophy, this is no small thing. At best, we have a mode of therapeutic deism within which psychiatric nomology is considered the primary and possibly only discourse. At worst, we find ourselves doing theology without God, which in the end turns into anthropology.
If the goal of exploring the role of spirituality and spiritual experience in depression is purely therapeutic, then neither of these observations is problematic. However, if the goal of exploring spiritual experience is theological, then we end up with a different set of questions. Why are happiness and health considered to be desirable goals? Equally as important, why is suffering considered to be innately bad, as is stated earlier in the paper? Why is it inevitably a form of evil?
Pushing Gently Against Modernity
On the first point, we might reflect on the fact that there is no word for health (in the medicalized way that we tend to use it today) in the Hebrew Scriptures, which are central to the three main Abrahamic traditions. Health in a biomedical sense had not been invented at that point in time.
The closest word is the term shalom, which has a primary meaning of righteousness, holiness, and right relationship with God (Wilkinson 1980, 5) . Theologically, health is not self-actualization or the absence of sadness; rather, it is the presence of God, even in the midst of suffering. Health does not require happiness, freedom from guilt, or the absence of illness; it relates primarily to a believer's relationship with God and their assurance of God's love and unending presence.
1 That being so, at least for members of these religious traditions, suffering is not inevitably bad. It is those forms of suffering that impose upon one's relationships with God that are considered to be bad and evil. Depression per se is not necessarily evil and does not inevitably interfere at this spiritual level.
Even within the paper, the idea that depression is innately bad comes under question. For example, the statement of David (in Karp 2001, 148) : "It has taken me more than two decades to abandon the medical language of cure in favour of a more spiritual vocabulary of transformation." Likewise, David Waldorf's quotation indicates that depression has helped him to know life's worth: "I think if an angel came up to me and said, "David, you can be healed of mental illness, but you'll never again know the worth of life again like you did when you were ill," I think I'd have to pick the mental illness'" (Waldorf 1999 , cited in Greider 2007 . I realize that Scrutton's point is to push back against idealist pictures that omit or play down the suffering people go through. On this basic point I agree. I would certainly not attempt to make an argument that everyone with depression enjoys it or is blessed by it. Nevertheless, the innateness of its moral negativity is not as obvious as Scrutton presents it. Other accounts from people experiencing regular and deep sadness seem to affirm this.
2 Each of the models outlined by Scrutton seems to indicate that deep sadness has the potential to be a place of revelation and transformation, as well as brokenness and lament. My concern would be that the attraction of the PT model seems more informed by a particular understanding of therapeutic ends than theological goals.
Conclusion
All of the models outlined by Scrutton have healing potential running alongside of deeply problematic aspects. I wonder if, rather than having three discrete models of the spiritual experience that we have to choose between, it may be useful to think of creating a theological bricolage of understandings within which each model (and perhaps many others) is allowed a creative and critical voice. Within such a perspective, there is space for the natural and the supernatural. There will be times when each model will function pathologically and other times when they will be healing. The key is to enable carers to work effectively with a wide range of models and perspectives and to be able to discern and effectively work with the tensions. Within such a bricolage, the empirical remains profoundly important, but opens itself to the possibility of surprise. Perhaps if we allow ourselves to be surprised, surprising things will emerge? Notes 1. God's Hesed (Hebrew) God's unfailing loving kindness.
2. See, for example, John E. Colwell's reflections on his experience of bipolar disorder (Colwell 2009 ).
